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Abstract
And like all stories there are of course the main characters, the public heroes, and, around
them, those who help them find a happy ending. The story in this Essay is written in honor of one
of the characters who played a key role in achieving the Treaty of Lisbon: Jean-Claude Piris, who
was for more than twenty two years, Director General of the Legal Service of the Council of the
EU. But to understand this story, to understand the reasons behind it, one should know its roots.
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INTRODUCTION
This is a story that began in early summer 2005 with a
violent shock and two big slaps in the face: the first, on May 29,
with 54.8% voting no in France, and the second, two days later,
on June 1, with 61.6% voting no in the Netherlands. And even
the brave people of Luxembourg who, a month later, on July 10,
produced a vote of 56.5% for yes could not change it: the
European Constitution was rejected, and with it, ten years of
work. Under its shiny outfit, which covered what was mostly a
consolidation of existing treaties, the European Constitution was
in reality, at its heart, a piece of institutional engineering, the
culmination of ten years of trial and unsuccessful attempts to
adapt the institutional structures of the European Union to the
largest expansion ever of its membership.
It is a story that ends on December 1, 2009, with the entry
into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. This treaty will probably be, in
the history of the European Union ("EU" or "Union"), the last,
if not greatest, and certainly the most voluminous treaty of this
type, the last of a generation of treaties that succeeded in
amending core provisions of the Union's set-up. It took more
than fifteen years to get there, to adapting EU institutions, the
* The author was assistant to Jean-Claude Piris, Director General of the Council
Legal Service, for eleven years. She is currently a Legal Adviser in the Legal Service of
the Council of the European Union and Head of the Coordination Unit of the Legal
Service. All views expressed in this Essay are strictly personal and do not represent the
views of the Legal Service or the Council of the European Union.
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EU's engine, to this major enlargement. This is partly why the
Treaty of Lisbon may seem already overtaken by events: it
contains solutions devised long ago and, in the meantime, the
world did not wait.
And like all stories there are of course the main characters,
the public heroes, and, around them, those who help them find a
happy ending. The story in this Essay is written in honor of one
of the characters who played a key role in achieving the Treaty of
Lisbon: Jean-Claude Piris, who was for more than twenty two
years, Director General of the Legal Service of the Council of the
EU. But to understand this story, to understand the reasons
behind it, one should know its roots.
I. THE GENESIS OF THE STORY
In 1993, the Heads of State or Government of the then
twelve European Union Member States decided to open the door
of the EU to its recently freed neighbors in Central and Eastern
Europe.' They also decided that before bringing in new
members, they should adapt the Union's engine-its structure
and the functioning of its institutions-to bear its new charge if
the Union was to keep going forward: "deepening" and
"widening," hand in hand.2 They were, however, careful not to
dig deeper into underlying issues-such as the ultimate purpose
of the European Union, its borders, and its future-on which
everyone had an opinion, but for which there was no answer
acceptable to everyone.
As foreseen by the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992, an
Intergovernmental Conference ("IGC") was convened in 1996
(known as the Amsterdam IGC) for the purpose of, among other
things, examining the possible extension of the co-decision
procedure to new sectors.3 To this commitment was added, in
1. See Copenhagen European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, E.U. BUu.,
no. 6, at 13 (1993) ("The European Council today agreed that the associated countries in
Central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European
Union."); see also id. (listing the criteria, known as the "Copenhagen criteria," that should
govern the enlargement of the European Union ("EU")).
2. Id. ("The Union's capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the
momentum of European integration, is also an important consideration in the general
interest of both the Union and the candidate countries.").
3. See Treaty on European Union (Maastricht text) art. N(2), July 29, 1992, 1992
O.J. C 191/1 [hereinafter Maastricht TEU]. It was also anticipated that the
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December 1993 when concluding the institutional issues of the
accession negotiations with Austria, Finland, and Sweden, the
promise of adapting the institutions of the EU to accommodate
its forthcoming enlargement:
In adopting the institutional provisions of the Accession
Treaty, the Member States and the applicant countries agree
that, as well as examining the legislative role of the European
Parliament and the other matters envisaged in the Treaty on
European Union, the Intergovernmental Conference to be
convened in 1996 will consider the questions relating to the
number of members of the Commission and the weighting
of the votes of the Member States in the Council. It will also
consider any measures deemed necessary to facilitate the
work of the Institutions and guarantee their effective
operation.4
Indeed the core issues in view of this next enlargement
were, on the one hand, the question of the number of
Commissioners-would the Union ultimately have a Commission
of thirty, thirty-five, or forty members?-and, on the other hand,
the question of the weighting of votes in the Council of the
European Union ("Council"). The challenge would be to keep a
democratic balance in the voting system given the significant
increase in the number of less populated Member States relative
to the number of more populated states, and how to
"compensate" the large states' likely loss of their second
Commissioner. One should remember that in the original setup
of the Union, the most populous Member States each had two
Intergovernmental Conference ("ICG") would review the provision on defense and
possibly add provisions on civil protection, energy, and tourism, deal with the
composition of the Commission and of the European Parliament, or introduce a
hierarchy of norms. See Maastricht TEU, Declaration on Civil Protection, Energy and
Tourism, 1992 O.J. C 191, at 97; Maastricht TEU, Declaration on the Number of
Members of the Commission and of the European Parliament, 1992 O.J. C 191, at 101;
Maastricht TEU, Declaration on the Hierarchy of Community Acts, 1992 O.J. C 191, at
101. The Treaty of Maastricht came into force in November 1993 after an initial negative
referendum in Denmark in June 1992 (50.7% voting no), followed by a positive
referendum in May 1993 (56.7% voting yes). See Finn Laursen, Denmark and the
Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, in THE RATIFICATION OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY:
ISSUES, DEBATES AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS 69, 78 (Finn Laursen & Sophie
Vanhoonacker eds., 1994).
4. See Brussels European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, E.U. BULL., no.
12, at 18 (1993).
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Commissioners5 while other states had one. Likewise, the
number of weighted votes allocated to each Member State by the
original Rome Treaty and successive amending treaties was
roughly based on the size of its population. But enlargement
after enlargement decreased the relative weight of large states
compared to that of the less populous, but more numerous,
states.6
Since 1993, every six months at each meeting of the
European Council, the Heads of State or Government of the
twelve, and later, fifteen Member States had, in the same breath,
welcomed the progressive steps on the path toward the Central
European enlargement, (the negotiations for which actually only
began after the 1996 IGC), and had drummed their commitment
to prepare the EU institutions for this enlargement.7 Yet,
although all elements of the debate on the adaptation of the EU
institutions had been amply exposed and discussed, and despite a
final appeal from the European Council in December 1996,8 the
Amsterdam IGC failed to cut the Gordian knot.
5. See id. at 16 (Spain, with a population of about 40 million, also had two
Commissioners, i.e., the same as the four largest Member States, which have (or had)
populations of about 60 million; Germany's population, after its reunification in 1990,
was 80 million).
6. SeeJEAN-CLAUDE PIRIS, THE CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 96-
105 (2006); see also, JEAN-CLAUDE PIRIS, THE LISBON TREATY: A LEGAL AND POLITICAL
ANALYSIS 213-21, 225-29 (2010). The proportion of votes in the Council allocated to
each of the four most populous states decreased between 1958 and 2005 from 23.5% of
the total votes to 8.4%. Taken together, these four states' representation in the Council
decreased from 70.5% of the total votes to 33.6% even though they represent 53.64% of
the EU population. See Council Decision No. 2010/795/EU, 2010 0.J. L 338/47 (listing
EU Member State populations for 2011).
7. See Corfu European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, E.U. BULL. no. 6, at
8 (1994); see also Turin European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, E.U. BULL.
no. 3, at 9 (1996) ("[F]uture enlargement, which represents a historic mission and a
great opportunity for Europe, is also a challenge for the Union in all its dimensions. In
this perspective, institutions and their functioning, and procedures must be improved in
order to preserve the capacity for action . . . ."); Cannes European Council, Conclusions
of the Presidency, E.U. BULL. no. 6, at 23-24 (1995); Madrid European Council,
Conclusions of the Presidency, E.U. BULL. no. 12, at 23-24 (1995); Essen European
Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, E.U. BULL. no. 12, at 20-26 (1994).
8. See Dublin European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, E.U. BULL., no. 12,
at 13 (1996) ("The Union needs to improve its ability to take decisions and to act. This
is already true today and it will be even more necessary as the Union moves to enlarge its
membership further.... The European Council notes that the Presidency document ...
does not include texts in Treaty form on the issue of flexibility and on certain sensitive
institutional questions, although it offers an analysis of the issues and identifies options.
In the next phase of the Conference solutions must be found on all institutional issues,
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The Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997 did improve the
functioning of the EU, for instance, in the field of foreign policy,
by establishing a new office of the high representative for
common foreign and security policy ("CFSP"),' and in the field
of justice and home affairs ("JHA"), by the "communitarisation"
of three sectors, namely asylum, immigration, and judicial
cooperation in civil matters.'0 It also integrated the Schengen
acquis," upgraded and expanded the co-decision procedure, and
added the provisions on enhanced cooperation.1 2 But the "High
Contracting Parties" left intact the original institutional engine,
limiting themselves to record their failure in a "Protocol on the
institutions with the prospect of enlargement of the European
Union." This protocol, popularly called the "Amsterdam
leftovers," postponed the deadline by which one would have had
to fix the engine: it would no longer have to be before the start
of the Central European accession negotiations, but before the
entry into force of the Accession Treaty.
The European Council in June 1997 declared that "with the
successful conclusion of the Intergovernmental Conference, the
way is now open for launching the enlargement process."13 This
is what the European Council did in December 1997 when, while
meeting in Luxembourg, it decided that "the enlargement
process" would be launched at the end of March 1998.14 The
including in particular on the size of the Commission, the role of the European
Parliament, the collective association of national parliaments, [and] the voting
mechanisms in the Council . ... The European Council emphasizes strongly that the
future of the Union and the success of the further enlargement to which it has
committed itself will depend on a satisfactory resolution of all of these questions.").
9. See Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts art. 1(10), 1997 O.J.
C 340/1, at 13 [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam]. The holder of this new function
between 1999 and 2009 was Javier Solana, former Secretary General of NATO and
former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain.
10. See id. art. 2(15), at 28.
11. See Treaty of Amsterdam, Protocol Integrating the Schengen Acquis into the
Framework of the European Union, 1997 O.J. C 340/93.
12. See id. arts. 1(12), 2(5), at 22, 2 5 .
13. See Amsterdam European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, E.U. BULL.,
no. 6, at 9 (1997).
14. See Luxembourg European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, E.U. BULL.,
no. 12, at 9 (1997) [hereinafter Luxembourg European Council 1997]. The first series
of negotiations began with six states on March 31, 1998 (Cyprus, the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia), see id. at 5, followed two years later, on
February 15, 2000, by the second series of negotiations with six other states (Bulgaria,
12212011]
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European Council did, however, recall that " [a] s a prerequisite
for enlargement of the Union, the operation of the institutions
must be strengthened and improved in keeping with the
institutional provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty."15
The Nice IGC of 2000 was to focus on the unresolved
institutional issues.16 Its mandate was strictly institutional: "size
and composition of the Commission; weighting of votes in the
Council (re-weighting, introduction of a dual majority and
threshold for qualified-majority decision making); [and] possible
extension of qualified-majority voting in the Council."1 7
The IGC ended on December 9, 2000, after three days and
two nights of tough negotiations, without having actually solved
the core problems: the principle that the number of
Commissioners should be reduced was agreed upon, but without
setting out the number;18 and the reweighting of votes in the
Council was more of a last-minute tinkering than a lasting and
balanced solution (too many votes for some Member States
compared to their size, not enough for others, and an increase of
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, and Slovakia), see Helsinki European Council,
Conclusions of the Presidency, E.U. BULL., no. 12, at 8 (1999).
15. See Luxembourg European Council 1997, supra note 14, at 9.
16. See Cologne European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, E.U. BULL., no.
6, at 13-14 (1999) ("In order to ensure that the European Union's institutions can
continue to work efficiently after enlargement, the European Council confirms its
intention of convening [an IGC] early in 2000 to resolve the institutional issues left open
in Amsterdam that need to be settled before enlargement."). The same European
Council decided for the first time that, in parallel to the IGC, a new body called
"Convention" with a wider composition than an IGC would draft a Charter of
Fundamental Rights intended to be solemnly proclaimed by the three institutions
(European Parliament, Council, and Commission), and "[i]t will then have to be
considered whether and, if so, how the Charter should be integrated into the treaties."
Id. at 35-36. On this new type of body, see FLORENCE DELOCHE-GAUDEZ, NOTRE
EUROPE, THE CONVENTION ON A CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: A METHOD FOR
THE FUTURE? (Nov. 2001).
17. Id. at 14.
18. The Protocol on the Enlargement of the European Union, which repealed the
"Amsterdam Leftovers" protocol, provided that the number of commissioners who
would be appointed after the accession of the twenty-seventh Member State (the one
that would take office on November 1, 2009) would be "less than the number of
Member States." Consolidated Version of the Treaty of European Union, Protocol (No.
10) on the Enlargement of the European Union, art. 4, 2006 O.J. C 321 E/5, at 231. It
would be up to the Council to determine unanimously the number of Commissioners
and the arrangements for an equal rotation between Member States "as regards
determination of the sequence of, and the time spent by, their nationals as Members of
the Commission," in a way that "reflect[s] satisfactorily the demographic and
geographical range of all the Member States of the Union." Id. at 232.
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the threshold for qualified-majority voting). As for the extension
of qualified-majority voting to the other fields, this was
abandoned in the middle of the battle.
However, in a "declaration on the future of the Union," the
heads of states or government congratulated each other on the
results and declared that the treaty "opens the way for
enlargement of the European Union and. .. with ratification of
the Treaty of Nice, the European Union will have completed the
institutional changes necessary for the accession of new Member
States."' 9 At the same time, they pledged to open a "a deeper and
wider debate about the future of the European Union," which
would include discussions on a more precise delimitation of
powers, the status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights
(proclaimed at Nice on December 7, 2000), the simplification of
the treaties, and an enhanced role for national parliaments.20
After this preparatory work, a new IGC was to be convened in
2004, with the understanding that it "shall not constitute any
form of obstacle or pre-condition to the enlargement process."21
Then events quickly unfolded: the adoption of the so-called
"Laeken Declaration" under the Belgian Presidency in
December 2001 gave a (wide) mandate to a "Convention on the
Future of Europe," which was composed of over 200 people
(representatives of governments, the European Parliament,
national parliaments, and the Commission), to prepare the work
of the 2004 IGC.22 The convention began its work on February
28, 2002 and submitted a draft treaty to the European Council in
July 2003. The IGC was convened in September 2003 and
concluded its work in June 2004. The signature of the Treaty
19. Treaty of Nice Amending the Treaty on the European Union, the Treaties
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Declaration on the
Future of the Union, 2001 O.J. C 80/1, at 85 [hereinafter Treaty of Nice, Declaration on
the Future of the Union].
20. Id.
21. Id. Signed in February 2001, the Treaty of Nice did not enter into force until
February 2003, after a first negative referendum in Ireland in June 2001 (54% voting
no), followed by a second referendum in October 2002 (62.8% voting yes). See Finn
Laursen, Introduction, in THE TREATY OF NICE: ACTOR PREFERENCES, BARGAINING AND
INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE 11 (Finn Laursen ed., 2006).
22. See Laeken European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, E.U. BULL., no.
12, at 2 (2001). For an account of the 2004 IGC, in which Jean-Claude Piris played an
important role, particularly as chairman of the group of legal experts of the IGC, see
PIRIS, THE CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE, supra note 6, at 49-55.
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Establishing a Constitution for Europe23 took place on October
29, 2004, by the twenty-five Member States (following the
accession of ten Member States on January 1, 2004).
The shape of this treaty, its title, its glitter, and the delusion
and misunderstandings it caused proved to be mistakes that were
probably fatal to it. But, in substance, the treaty did attain the
institutional response that the Union had sought in vain for ten
years and had pretended to have found in Nice: (1) a reduction
in the number of Commissioners to two-thirds of the number of
Member States from November 1, 2009, with a possible further
reduction; (2) a double majority system for the weighting of votes
in the Council as from November 1, 2009, providing for a
requirement that a successful vote must comprise at least 55% of
the number of Member States, representing at least 65% of the
population of the Union, a blocking minority having to include
at least four Member States; and (3) a significant extension of the
scope of qualified majority voting (and co-decision) especially in
the field ofjustice and home affairs.
The treaty also provided answers on topics that had long
been discussed: the role of the national parliaments in
monitoring the respect of the principle of subsidiarity, the
incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights into the
treaty, a better delimitation of competences, a semblance of a
hierarchy of norms, the simplification of enhanced cooperation,
and the streamlining of legal instruments. In addition, the
dynamics inherent in the convention system had allowed other
innovations, including a single legal personality (the Union) and
the merger of pillars; the formalization of the European Council
into an institution; a modification to the system of six-monthly
presidency of the Council through the establishment of two new
stable functions: a President of the European Council and a
Union Minister for Foreign Affairs24 ; the creation of a European
diplomatic service incorporating the 130 Commission
delegations in the world; the insertion of simplified treaty
revision procedures and so-called "passerelles" (French for
23. Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 2004 O.J. C 310/1 (never
ratified) [hereinafter Draft Constitutional Treaty].
24. This new function of Minister combined three existing functions into one:
President of the Foreign Affairs Council (which so far belonged to the six-monthly
Presidency of the Council), the High Representative for Common Security and Defense
Policy ("CFSP"), and the Commissioner for External Relations.
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"footbridges") injecting internal flexibility in the system; the
insertion of a horizontal social clause, and the insertion of
specific legal bases on economic discipline in the euro area,
public services, energy, civil protection, humanitarian assistance,
and space. Then came the slap in the face during the summer of
2005.
II. THE STORY IN HISTORY
The blow was hard, everyone was a little groggy, and the
atmosphere became unreal. The then European Council
President, Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker,
declared bravely that "[t]he European construction does not
stop today."25 The Heads of State or Government at the
European Council of June 16 and 17, 2005, took note of the two
negative referenda, but, noting that ten Member States had
already ratified the treaty,26 said the ratification process should
continue. They also decided to launch a "period of reflection" to
consider the concerns and worries expressed by citizens. A
rendezvous was set for the following year, in the first half of 2006,
for an overall assessment.27
The "period of reflection" soon turned into a period of
lethargy. In October 2005, the Commission launched a "Plan D
for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate," and a slogan appeared:
"Europe of results."28 The idea was to make the best of the
existing treaties, in their post-Nice versions, to create conditions
conducive to an "institutional settlement," as the Commission
described the problem to be solved. There was obviously no
25. Jean-Claude Juncker, Luxembourg Prime Minister and then President of the
European Council, Statement Following the Results of the French Referendum (May 30,
2005), available at http://www.eu2005.lu/en/actualites/communiques/2005/05/29jclj-
ref/index.html.
26. The Draft Constitutional Treaty was ratified by Spain by referendum held on
February 20, 2005 (76% voting yes), and Germany, by parliamentary vote, on May 27, as
well as Austria, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. See The
Constitution-Ratification, UNIV. DE ZARAGOZA, http://www.unizar.es/euroconstitucion/
Treaties/TreatyConstRat.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2011).
27. Brussels European Council, Declaration by the Heads of State or Government
of the Member States of the European Union on the Ratification of the Treaty
Establishing a Constitution for Europe, E.U. BULL., no. 6 (2005).
28. See Commission of the European Communities, A Citizens' Agenda: Delivering
Results for Europe, COM (2006) 211 Final, at 3 (May 2006). This communication
followed several statements by politicians in this direction.
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"plan B," and it all began to look like a first-class burial of the
Constitutional Treaty and its innovations. It is likely that some
people were not particularly sad about this, either because they
never liked the idea of losing "their" commissioner or a piece of
the fame brought by the six-month Council presidency, or
because the failure reinforced their cynical outlook that the
project would end in ruins.
What to do? How to get out of this swamp that could
become noxious to the European Union? One could not let the
institutional solutions go awry, as they were the real advances at
the heart of this long negotiation between fifteen, and later
twenty-five, Member States: there had finally been an agreement,
they had all signed, and many of them were still ratifying.29
In addition, the central elements of this long negotiation,
made invisible because they had been melted into the mass of the
long Constitutional Treaty that codified existing texts, had not
caused particular trouble or raised frontal opposition during the
referendum debates. One does not recall that the introduction of
the double majority in the Council, the reduction of the number
of commissioners, the extension of qualified majority voting, the
creation of the two new positions of President of the European
Council or Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union, or the
creation of a European diplomatic service played a decisive role
in the debates.
It was rather Part III of the Constitutional Treaty that had
been scrutinized and had raised the most questions and
opposition. Part III was, in essence, the recasting or codification
of the technical provisions (i.e., the collection of "legal bases," or
enabling clauses, that list the powers entrusted by the Member
States to the EU institutions) contained in the original Treaty
Establishing the European Community (the Treaty of Rome of
1957, as amended four times, most recently in Nice). In fact,
some of the most virulent critics focused more on the policy
options chosen when legislating on the basis of these provisions
29. By early 2007, after the accession of Bulgaria and Romania on January 1, two-
thirds of Member States (eighteen out of twenty-seven states) had ratified the Draft
Constitutional Treaty. Apart from Luxembourg, all those who had planned a
referendum that should have taken place after the two negative referenda (Denmark,
Ireland, Poland, Portugal, and the United Kingdom) had frozen the procedure. The
Czech Republic and Sweden had frozen their parliamentary procedure.
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rather than on the treaty's legal bases themselves, which had
existed for ten, twenty, or fifty years.30
Studies conducted after the referenda revealed that the
French no vote was primarily because of economic and social
reasons, accompanied by a malaise vis-A-vis enlargement, and that
the Dutch no was much more about sovereignty (the impression
that the Netherlands were paying too much for the Union, and
that they could lose control of their sovereignty and identity). 3
In his capacity as legal counsel to all the IGCs since
Maastricht, Jean-Claude Piris had been at the heart of all these
debates. He had helped draft the text of the most delicate
compromises and the most acrobatic devices. He knew the ins
and outs of the discussions that had taken place over all these
years.32 And Jean-Claude Piris was not one to give up.
The solution lay between two quite obvious limits. On the
one hand, it would be impossible to renegotiate everything from
scratch. One cannot redo a negotiation of this magnitude among
twenty-seven states. On the other hand, doing nothing and
allowing the wind of division and failure to blow upon the Union
was dangerous for the European project itself.
30. In France, for example, the draft directive on free movement of services
(Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on Services in
the Internal Market, 2006 0.3. L 376/36) had been very hotly debated. During the
referendum debate in France, ludicrous issues appeared, such as debates on the "Polish
plumber" supposedly taking French jobs, how easy it would be to negotiate a "social
treaty" with the other twenty-six Member States, the supposed existence of a necessarily
true, if hidden, "plan B" in case of a no vote, the principle of "free and undistorted
competition" that would be written "in stone," the contention that Article 2 of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights ("Charter"), which enshrines the right to life (and the
prohibition of the death penalty) would prevent abortion in France, or that Article 10 of
the Charter on freedom of thought, conscience, and religion would prevent France
from adopting a law banning the wearing of headscarves in public schools (although
these two provisions simply copied the corresponding provisions of the European
Convention of Human Rights of 1950, respectively Articles 2 and 9, which had been
applicable in France since 1974).
31. For an analysis of the reasons of the negative referendums, see PIRIS, THE
CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE, supra note 6, at 9-24.
32. He had also contributed to the discussion in several publications, notably in
1995, using the pseudonym "Justus Lipsius." He authored The 1996 Intergovernmental
Conference, 20 EUR. L. REv., 235, 235, 262 n.38 (1995), where he suggested merging the
four legal personalities (EU, EC, Euratom and ECSC) of the time into one (the
European Union), in a single treaty, a short and readable Treaty Charter, with protocols
incorporating the technical provisions.
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The heart of the solution would necessarily be the political
package of innovations that was contained in the Constitutional
Treaty. The more one moved away from the subtle, delicate
balances and mutual concessions that had enabled the
negotiation to succeed, the more one moved away from a
solution. To reopen part of that package might lead to the
reopening of another element that had been negotiated in
exchange, and so on until the dismantling of the whole.
In the autumn of 2005, Jean-Claude Piris began to write an
updated and expanded French version of his book on the
Constitutional Treaty that he had published in English.33 In a
final section devoted to different imaginable scenarios, he
described eleven of them; the fifth concerned placing the
innovations of the Constitutional Treaty in a shorter text.3 4 To
see if such a scenario was feasible, and to see how many pages a
treaty that limited itself to these innovations would have to
contain, without recopying the existing provisions,35 it was
necessary to prepare projects and to try it.
By late autumn 2005 and into 2006, efforts were made to do
just that. The general idea was to make something different and
shorter, while including what had been the heart of the
negotiation. The drafting method would be the reverse of that of
the Constitutional Treaty. One would proceed, as in all previous
IGCs, through an amending treaty, which limited itself by
inserting the new elements into the existing structure, and not by
way of a codifying treaty that replaces and repeals by modifying
hundreds of existing provisions. So the structure would still be
based on the two treaties inherited from Maastricht: the Treaty
on European Union ("TEU") and the Treaty Establishing the
33. See PIRIS, THE CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE, supra note 6. The manuscript of that
book had been delivered to publisher in late September 2005.
34. See JEAN-CLAUDE PIRIS, LE TRAITE CONSTITUTIONNEL POUR L'EUROPE: UNE
ANALYSE JURIDIQUE [THE CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY FOR EUROPE: A LEGAL ANALYSIS]
248-73 (2006). The idea of placing most of the innovations of the Constitutional Treaty
in a shorter text was in the air, as shown in footnotes 360 and 361 of the book (excerpts
from statements of the yes camp in France (Nicolas Sarkozy) as well as from the no
camp (Laurent Fabius) and from other politicians like Romano Prodi, then president of
the Council in Italy).
35. Length would be an important criteria because the length of the Constitutional
Treaty (about 700 pages) had been widely criticized (an unfair criticism because those
700 pages were in effect replacing almost 3000 pages of primary law spread across
seventeen treaties, including the various accession treaties).
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European Community ("EC Treaty"),36 which would be
renamed, in order to realize the merger into one (the Union) of
the two legal personalities (the Union and the European
Community) ? All this was, of course, only about the drafting
method. It would then be up to politicians to choose which of the
innovations of the Constitutional Treaty they wished to retain,
modify, or abandon.
One option, a bit maximalist, could have been a kind of
Constitutional Treaty without its Part III. This would have
replaced, as a block, the Treaty on European Union by the
provisions of Parts I and IV (Final Provisions) of the
Constitutional Treaty. This would have kept the reader-friendly
character of Part I of the Constitutional Treaty, which had been
conceived as a sort of "reader's digest" in which one could find
the "fundamentals" of the Union (e.g., its values and objectives,
the rights of its citizens, its competences, its institutions),
collected in about thirty pages. To this would have been added
the full text of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (Part II of the
Constitutional Treaty) and the insertion of the innovations
contained in Part III in the form of amendments to the technical
provisions of the EC Treaty (in an amending protocol). The EC
Treaty would have become a sort of "toolbox," the receptacle of
the detailed provisions (legal bases and institutional
arrangements) of the Union, while the TEU would have become
a kind of general treaty, the two treaties constituting an
inseparable whole. 8
36. In addition, of course, to the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy
Community, Mar. 25,1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167.
37. Several names were possible: the Treaty on European Union could have been
renamed, for example, the Basic Treaty on European Union; the EC Treaty could
become, for example, the Treaty on the Competences of the European Union or the
Treaty on the Functioning and Competences of the European Union. In order to merge
two legal personalities, "Community" would have to be replaced by "Union."
38. In this regard, a drafting question arose: how to translate this unity of the two
treaties when the articles of the TEU and the EC Treaty used the words "this Treaty."
One could have inserted a provision stating that when the text referred to "this Treaty,"
it also meant the other treaty, or else the words "this Treaty," could have been replaced
by "the founding Treaties" or "the Treaties." The latter solution was finally chosen,
together with an explicit statement under which this formula means the two treaties
would "have the same legal value." See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European
Union art. 1, 2010 O.J. C 83/13, at 16 [hereinafter TEU post-Lisbon]; Consolidated
Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 1(2), 2010 O.J. C
83/47, at 50 [hereinafter TFEU]).
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Other options incrementally departed from the style and
appearance of the Constitutional Treaty and increasingly
resembled a conventional amending treaty, with the undesirable
result of being less reader friendly. This increased the risk of
criticism upon ratification due to the difficulty in reading and
understanding it."
There were several conceivable alternatives, depending on
the sensitivities. On structure, one could either try to introduce
into the TEU the structure of Part I of the Constitutional Treaty
and that of Part III of the Constitutional Treaty into the EC
Treaty,40 or one could maintain existing structures and limit
oneself to inserting the innovations inside these structures. On
length, one could either faithfully introduce in the TEU and the
EC Treaty all the innovations brought by the Constitutional
Treaty, including the new vocabulary, or one could try to find
ways to keep the essence of these innovations while limiting the
number of changes, and hence the length of the amending
treaty. On symbols, one could either keep as much of the
"constitutional" character of the vocabulary as possible, or one
could eliminate as much as possible this character, which could
be considered as having played a role in the rejection of the
Constitutional Treaty. On readability, one could either try to
39. The usual method of drafting amendments, which could be described as a
"lace method," consists of a series of paragraphs specifying that "In Article XX,
paragraph YY shall be replaced by the following," that "In Article XX, the phrase 'AY'
shall be deleted," and that "In Article XX, first paragraph, third indent, the words 'YW'
shall be replaced by 'ZZZ."' This certainly allows the reader to identify precisely the
differences from the existing text, but it is very indigestible. A less-detailed drafting
method consists of replacing a whole article or chapter "in block." The text is more
readable, but the reader who wishes to identify the innovations is constrained to a
tedious exercise of comparative reading of old and new texts to discover the differences.
The Constitutional Treaty had been criticized for its length and for the fact that it was
difficult to understand, but it was written in prose, so to that extent, it was legible.
40. The structure of Part III of the Constitutional Treaty reshuffled the EC Treaty,
first for consistency. For instance, it regrouped the provisions dealing with the same
subject, such as provisions on external action, which had been scattered in the EC
Treaty: trade (Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community arts. 131-34, 2006 O.J. C 321 E/37, at 103 [hereinafter EC Treaty]) was
located between employment and customs cooperation, separately from development
cooperation (id. art. 177) and from the procedure for negotiating international
agreements (id. art. 300). The other reason was political and presentational: for
instance, it was more appropriate, in Part III of the Constitutional Treaty, to place the
provisions on free movement of persons before those on the free movement of goods,
while in the EC Treaty the provisions on goods and agriculture came before those on
persons.
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adopt a drafting method which, although "amending" rather
than "codifying," remained as much as possible a prose text, or
one could choose the "lace" drafting technique, with many
detailed amendments, and thus would be almost unreadable.
These options and alternatives could be combined, with
varying degrees of similarity or distance from the text of the
Constitutional Treaty and in varying length. The goal was to find
a balance between readability, brevity, and fidelity to the
innovations of the Constitutional Treaty.
For example, drafting a text that contained a mere
reference to the Charter of Fundamental Rights ("Charter"),
conferring on it the quality of primary law, allowed the drafters
to save some fifty articles (twenty pages). But doing so required a
political decision, given the symbolic nature of reproducing-or
not-the Charter in full within the treaty.4 ' Not reproducing it in
the treaty diminished its resemblance to the Constitutional
Treaty (which could be an advantage for some and a drawback
for others).
Another example was the choice of whether to use the terms
"European laws" and "European framework laws" introduced by
the Constitutional Treaty.42 Not to incorporate these new names
would have shortened the text by a dozen pages by having fewer
technical amendments. 43 But these new terms allowed readers to
41. The integration of the Charter into the treaties had been an important goal for
several Member States, notably Germany. See E.U. BULL., supra note 16, at 13, 35-36; see
also Treaty of Nice, Declaration on the Future of the Union, supra note 19, 2001 O.J. C
80, at 85 (stating that the European Council, in charting the enlargement process,
should address the "status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union").
42. Not only for the sake of bringing some semblance of hierarchy between norms
and streamlining them, but also for symbolic reasons (e.g., the noble and constitutional
character of the word "law"), the Constitutional Treaty provided for a new typology of
acts of the Union. While the existing treaties provided for fifteen different instruments,
the Constitutional Treaty had limited their number to six (European laws, European
framework laws, European regulations, European decisions, recommendations, and
opinions). See PIRIS, THE CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE, supra note 6, at 70-73.
43. In the Constitutional Treaty, the introduction of these new names led to a
redrafting of almost all the legal bases to change the subject of the verb. Previously the
subject of the verb was the institution that adopted the act; for example, "the Council,
acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251 [i.e., co-decision],
[shall establish measures] [shall adopt directives]." In the Constitutional Treaty,
however, the subject of the verb had become the law or framework law ("European laws
shall establish measures . . . ."). Therefore, introducing the new vocabulary "law" and
"framework law" into the EC Treaty would have required the replacement of the subject
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distinguish what was legislative (the acts called "laws," or
"framework laws") from what was nonlegislative. Defining an act
as legislative occasioned a series of automatic consequences: the
proceedings in the Council for its adoption had to be public,4 4
the obligation that such an act had to be adopted on a proposal
from the Commission, 4 5 the hierarchical relationship between
the laws and "delegated acts,"46 the obligation to inform national
parliaments, and the subsequent control by them of the respect
of the principle of subsidiarity.4 7 It was therefore necessary to
keep the substance of this innovation (the distinction between
legislative and nonlegislative acts), without necessarily keeping
the method for achieving it. This could be achieved through
identifying what is legislative by the type of procedure followed to
adopt the act (i.e., by specifying that the procedure is of a
legislative character) rather than by the name of the act." But
of the verbs in almost all the legal bases of the EC Treaty and thus numerous (and
lengthy) technical "lace-like" adjustments (on this drafting method, see supra note 39).
44. Compare TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 38, art. 16(8), 2010 0.J. C 83, at 24 ("The
Council shall meet in public when it deliberates and votes on a draft legislative act.")
and TFEU, supra note 38, art. 15(2), 2010 O.J. C 83, at 54 ("The European Parliament
shall meet in public, as shall the Council when considering and voting on a draft
legislative act."), with Draft Constitutional Treaty, supra note 23, arts. 1-24(6), 1-50(2),
2004 O.J. C 310, at 21, 35.
45. Compare TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 38, art. 17(2), 2010 O.J. C 83, at 25
("Union legislative acts may only be adopted on the basis of a Commission proposal,
except where the Treaties provide otherwise."), with Draft Constitutional Treaty, supra
note 23, art. 1-26(2), 2004 O.J. C 310, at 22.
46. Only legislative acts may delegate to the Commission the power to adopt
delegated acts, while implementing powers may be conferred (on the Commission or on
the Council) by any legally binding act of the Union, and therefore not only by a
legislative act. Compare TFEU, supra note 38, arts. 290, 291, 2010 0.J. C 83, at 172-73,
with Draft Constitutional Treaty, supra note 23, arts. 1-36, 1-37, 2004 O.J. C 310, at 28.
47. See 2010 Consolidated TEU & TFEU, Protocol (No. 1) on the Role of National
Parliaments in the European Union art. 2, 2010 O.J. C 83/201, at 204; 2010
Consolidated TEU & TFEU, Protocol (No. 2) on the Application of the Principles of
Subsidiarity and Proportionality art. 4, 2010 O.J. C 83/206, at 206 [hereinafter Protocol
(No. 2)] ("Draft legislative acts ... shall be forwarded to national Parliaments.").
48. One would specify, in the legal bases, that the act was adopted "in accordance
with the ordinary legislative procedure" (co-decision) or "in accordance with a special
legislative procedure." The proximity of this wording with that previously used allowed
for cases of co-decision to use a horizontal adaptation to replace, in all the legal bases,
the words "the Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article
251" with "the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the
ordinary legislative procedure." This method of horizontal adaptation was very much
used in the Treaty of Lisbon for amending the EC Treaty and the protocols, which
required many mechanical and technical modifications. See Treaty of Lisbon Amending
the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community
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again, like the Charter, this would require a political decision,
given the symbolic nature of the decision to use the word "law"
and "framework law."
Similarly, the wish to keep the text that would remain in the
TEU readable and concise could lead to the transfer to the EC
Treaty-the "toolbox"-of a number of provisions contained in
Part I of the Constitutional Treaty, notably the more technical
ones (e.g., some legal bases, the too-detailed provisions).49 But
such a transfer could also be symbolic. For example, Title III of
Part I of the Constitutional Treaty contained provisions on the
definition and delimitation of Union competence. A transfer of
these provisions from the "general treaty," which the TEU would
become, to the "toolbox" could be viewed as a diminution of
their importance.50
The same concern of readability could also bring about a
breakdown between, on the one hand, the most "noble"
amendments made to the EC Treaty, which could be grouped
together in Article 2 of the amending treaty-for example, blocks
of changes to the CFSP, JHA, horizontal provisions inserted at
the beginning of the EC Treaty, the governance of the euro,
some new legal bases (e.g., energy, civil protection, public
services)-and, on the other hand, technical and mechanical
changes, which, when mixed with the "noble" ones, would have
affected the readability of the whole, and could therefore be
located in an amending protocol.5 ' The above examples illustrate
art. 2, 2007 O.J. C 306/1, at 42-45 [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon]. To streamline the
number of legal instruments of the Union, it was enough to keep the five types of
instruments used in the EC Treaty from the origin (regulations, directives, decisions,
recommendations, and opinions) and to extend their application to all areas of action
of the EU (except the area of CFSP where only decisions can be adopted). See TFEU,
supra note 38, art. 288, 2010 0.J. C 83, at 171-72.
49. A side effect of the "reader's digest" character of Part I of the Constitutional
Treaty was that it contained in many respects repetitive provisions, details of which were
in Part III. To shorten and simplify Part I, one could simply transfer some of its
provisions into the EC Treaty, from where they had been partially copied.
50. Other transfers in the "toolbox" were more obvious, such as the provisions
relating to legal acts (arts. 1-33 to 1-39), those on the finances of the Union (arts. 1-53 to
1-56), or those describing the CFSP and JHA (arts. I-40 to 1-42). The list of provisions
that would eventually be transferred to the EC Treaty is contained in Annex 2 of the
mandate of the Lisbon IGC. See Brussels European Council, Presidency Conclusions,
EU. BULL., no. 6, at 23-25 (2007).
51. This kind of division between the "noble" and "technical" had already been
used in the Treaty of Amsterdam. The first part contained the "substantive changes" and
the second part, entitled "simplification," contained provisions cleaning up lapsed
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the policy choices that were considered by different drafting
methods, which aimed at making the text shorter or more
readable. Meanwhile, time passed.
In June 2006, under the Austrian presidency, the European
Council noted in a remarkable understatement that "the
reflection period has overall been useful,"5 2 that fifteen Member
States had ratified the Constitutional Treaty,5 3 and that, in the
spirit of a "Europe of results," one should make the "best use ...
of the possibilities offered by the existing treaties in order to
deliver the concrete results that citizens expect."54 These
conclusions also invited the incoming German presidency in the
following year (first semester 2007), first, to adopt a declaration
on March 25 commemorating the fifty years of the Treaty of
Rome and, second, to present a report to the European Council
"based on extensive consultations with Member States [that]
should contain an assessment of the state of discussion with
regard to the Constitutional Treaty and explore possible future
developments."5 5 The outcome of this examination was to "serve
as the basis for further decisions on how to continue the reform
process, it being understood that the necessary steps to that
effect will have been taken during the second semester of 2008 at
the latest."5 6
Then the German presidency, led by Angela Merkel, arrived.
As requested by the European Council in June 2006, the
provisions and renumbering articles. This method was used in the Treaty of Lisbon only
for the amendments to the protocols to the EC Treaty and amendments to the Euratom
Treaty, see Treaty of Lisbon, Protocol No. 1 Amending the Protocols Annexed to the
Treaty on European Union, to the Treaty Establishing the European Community
and/or to the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, 2007 O.J. C
306/165; Treaty of Lisbon, Protocol No. 2 Amending the Treaty Establishing the
European Atomic Energy Community, 2007 O.J. C 306/199, but not for amendments
made to the EC Treaty itself, which are all contained in Article 2 of the Lisbon Treaty.
52. Brussels European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, E.U. BULL., no. 6, at
15 (2006) [hereinafter Brussels European Council 2006].
53. After the two negative referendums of June and July 2005, five more Member
States had ratified the Constitutional Treaty by June 2006: Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia,
Luxemburg, and Malta.
54. Brussels European Council 2006, supra note 52, at 15.
55. Id.
56. Id. This tight schedule was due to the wish to ensure that any new treaty would
be in force before the European elections ofJune 2009 and the appointment of the new
Commission in November 2009. It was therefore necessary that the treaty be signed in
late 2007 or early 2008 and that the ratifying procedure take place during 2008. See
PIRIS, supra note 34, at 244-48 (2006).
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presidency engaged in "extensive consultations with Member
States."5 ' By January 2, 2007, Angela Merkel already informed
her colleagues by letter that she would organize confidential
consultations between the Heads of State or Government and
their close advisers to prepare the political declaration of March
25 and, at the same time, hold consultations on a possible
continuation of the constitutional process to develop a viable
proposal for the June European Council on the basis of extensive
consultations with all partners. She asked her colleagues to
appoint "contact points."
The various projects that had been tried previously, the real-
life tests, helped provide a description in brief notes for the
German presidency, as soon as it started, of the possible drafting
methods, with their advantages and disadvantages and the
approximate length of the texts that would result from this or
that option. These notes would be accompanied by various drafts
of an amending treaty, of varying lengths and degrees of
readability, illustrating different options (with or without the
Charter, with or without "law," with or without a distinction
between the "noble" provisions and the more technical ones,
etc.).
In the Berlin Declaration of March 25, 2007 celebrating the
fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Rome,
recalling the dream of European unification that had become
reality, a good which should be protected for future generations,
the last paragraph stated that "we are united in our aim of
placing the European Union on a renewed common basis before
the European Parliament elections in 2009.""5
Gradually, the extensive consultations were being
transformed into a kind of pre-IGC. The main elements of the
"constitutional process," as Chancellor Merkel had called it in
her letter, appeared quickly as follows 59 :
57. Brussels European Council 2006, supra note 52, at 15.
58. Presidency of the European Union, Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth
Anniversary of the Signature of the Treaties of Rome, pt. III (2007), available at
http://www.eu2007.de/de/News/download -docs/Maerz/0324-RAA/English.pdf.
59. Letter dated January 2, 2007 from Angela Merkel, Chancellor of Germany, to
her counterparts (on file with author).
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-abandonment of both the "constitutional" concept of a
single text that recopied, and hence obliged to re-ratify, past
texts, and the title "Constitution";
-development of a shorter treatyo inserting, by amend-
ment, into the TEU (which retained its name) and the EC Treaty
(renamed "Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union")
the substantive innovations contained in the Constitutional
Treaty, particularly the "institutional package" and the
establishment of a single legal personality for the Union;
-adaptation of some of these innovations to meet the
concerns of some Member States, including, of course, France
and the Netherlands, but also the Czech Republic, Denmark,
Poland, the United Kingdom, and others.
About forty points were raised and discussed during the
months before the European Council of June 2007, points that
led to the deletion, modification, or addition of various
provisions or declarations. These points can be divided into nine
groups:
1. Abolition of the Pillars: To highlight the specific character
of the former second pillar (CFSP) in relation to other provisions
of the treaties, some Member State representatives insisted that
the CFSP chapter should remain located in the TEU and not be
transferred to the "toolbox" of the EC Treaty. They also obtained
(a) the addition of a paragraph on the specificity of the CFSP in
the first article of the CFSP chapter,61 (b) the exclusion of. the
CFSP from the scope of the flexibility clause,62 (c) a declaration
60. Approximately 200 pages in length (similar to that of the Treaty of
Amsterdam), compared with 700 pages for the Constitutional Treaty.
61. Compare TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 38, art. 24(1), 2010 0.J. C 83, at 30, with
Draft Constitutional Treaty, supra note 23, art. 1-16(1), 2004 O.J. C 310, at 17. However,
as in the Constitutional Treaty, the CFSP chapter was placed under a common umbrella
of principles and objectives, together with the provisions on the Union's external action,
which were in the TFEU. See TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 38, arts. 21-23, 2010 O.J. C 83,
at 28-30; TFEU, supra note 38, art. 205, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 139.
62. Compare TFEU, supra note 38, art. 352(4), 2010 0.J. C 83, at 196, with Draft
Constitutional Treaty, supra note 23, art. 1-18, 2004 O.J. C 310, at 15.
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concerning this subject (No. 41),6" and (d) a specific article on
data protection by Member States in this field.6 4
2. Delimitation of Competences: For some, the purpose was
to better frame the system of Union competences and to make it
clear, in particular, that the competences conferred on the
Union or exercised by it could also be given back to Member
States or that competences not yet exercised remained with
Member States. Consequently, several such reminders were
added in the provisions on relations between the Union and
Member States,65 in the provisions on competences 66 and in the
legal basis for the ordinary revision procedure of the treaties,'67
complemented by two declarations (Nos. 18 and 42).68
3. Charter of Fundamental Rights: Some Member States did
not want the Charter in the treaties, but the overwhelming
majority of Member States did want it incorporated. The solution
was to insert a reference to the Charter that would give it the
quality of primary law, but this had to be accompanied with an
express reminder that the Charter did not add to the
competences of the Union. 69
4. Role of National Parliaments: Some Member States
wanted to strengthen the role of national parliaments in
63. Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, Declaration 41 on Article 352 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, 2010 0.]. C 83/01, at 350 J2010 Consolidated TEU
& TFEU].
64. Compare TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 38, art. 39, 2010 0.J. C 83, at 36, with
Draft Constitutional Treaty, supra note 23, art. 1-51, 2004 O.J. C 310, at 36. There was
also agreement to add an article in Protocol 22 on the Position of Denmark (annexed to
the TEU and TFEU), specifying that the Danish opt-out would also apply to the
processing of personal data by Member States regarding activities in the JHA. Protocol
(No. 22) on the Position of Denmark, art. 2a, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 300.
65. Compare TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 38, art. 4(1), 2010 0.J. C 83, at 18, with
Draft Constitutional Treaty, supra note 23, art. 1-5, 2004 0.J. C 310, at 12.
66. Compare TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 38, art. 5(2), 2010 0.J. C 83, at 18 and
TFEU, supra note 38, arts. 2(2), 6, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 50, 52, with Draft Constitutional
Treaty, supra note 23, arts. 1-11(2), 1-12(2), 1-17, 2004 0.J. C 310, at 14, 15, 17.
67. Compare TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 38, art. 48(2), 2010 0.J. C 83, at 42, with
Draft Constitutional Treaty, supra note 23, art. IV-443(1), 2004 O.J. C 310, at 189.
68. See 2010 Consolidated TEU & TFEU, Declaration 18 in Relation to the
Delimitation of Competences, 2010 0.J. C 83/344, and Declaration 42 on Article 352 of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, id. at 351 (on limits of the
flexibility clause).
69. Compare TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 38, art. 6(1), 2010 0.J. C 83, at 19, with
Draft Constitutional Treaty, supra note 23, art. 1-9, 2004 O.J. C 310, at 13.
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monitoring compliance with the principle of subsidiarity by
introducing the possibility of a "red card" (right to block the
legislative process of the Union) in addition to the "yellow card"
system already foreseen. They obtained the extension from six to
eight weeks for the period during which national parliaments
may send the EU legislator a reasoned opinion on subisdiarity
(Protocol Nos. 1 and 2)70 and the addition of an article
highlighting the rights and role of national parliaments (Article
12 TEU).
5. Enlargement: Some wanted to include the so-called
"Copenhagen criteria" in the article on the enlargement
procedure. A declaration was envisaged, but not agreed at that
stage.
6. Primacy of Union Law: Some requested the deletion of
Article 1-6 of the Constitutional Treaty, which codified the
jurisprudential principle of primacy, but others opposed it. It was
therefore decided to delete the article but to insert a declaration
(No. 17) recalling the case law on this principle.
7. Terminology: Those who opposed using any
constitutional terminology (e.g., "law," "Minister") in the treaty
succeeded in having it removed, as well as the article on the
symbols of the Union.72
8. Special Procedures: In certain sensitive sectors, the
transition to qualified majority had been accompanied by a
mechanism called a "brake" or "emergency brake" by which the
European Council acted as a sort of appeals chamber. Some
called for the strengthening of one or the other of these
mechanisms. In compensation, they proposed to make it easier
to move toward enhanced cooperation in case of deadlock. The
70. Compare 2010 Consolidated TEU & TFEU, Protocol (No. 1) on the Role of
National Parliaments in the European Union, art. 4, 2010 0.J. C 83/203, at 204, and
Protocol (No. 2), supra note 47, art. 6, 2010 0.J. C 83, at 206, with Draft Constitutional
Treaty, Protocol 1 on the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union, art. 4,
2004 0.J. C 310, at 205 and Draft Constitutional Treaty, Protocol 2 on the Application of
the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, art. 6, 2004 O.J. C 310, at 208. At a
point, it was envisaged to give national parliaments a right similar to the citizens'
initiative by which they could invite the Commission to submit proposals in an area of
EU competence, but this idea was not pursued.
71. 2010 Consolidated TEU & TFEU, Declaration 17 Concerning Primacy, 2010
0.J. C 83/344.
72. See Draft Constitutional Treaty, supra note 23, art. 1-8, 2004 OJ. C 310, at 13 (on
the flag, anthem, motto, currency, and Europe day).
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"brake" mechanism was reinforced in the field of social
security, 5 but the "accelerator" mechanism was made easier to
use, and even extended in the field ofJHA.74
9. Clarifications and Additions in Some Areas: Some asked
for clarifications and additions in the areas of public services,
environment, and energy, but without effect at that stage, apart
from a draft declaration on public services.
The wish to clarify the division of powers also led to a series
of "surgical" adjustments and transfers of certain provisions from
one chapter to another, which made them fall within a different
legal regime. Such adaptations related to the definition of the
objectives of the Union, 75 the procedure for acceding to the
European Convention on Human Rights, the granting of
jurisdiction to the Court of Justice over European intellectual
property rights,76 and the provisions on diplomatic protection,
space and health.77 Articles giving the EU powers concerning
73. Compare TFEU, supra note 38, art. 48, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 67, with Draft
Constitutional Treaty, supra note 23, arts. 111-136(2), 2004 O.J. C 310, at 60.
74. CompareTFEU, supra note 38, arts. 82(3), 83(3), 86(1), 87(3), 2010 0.J. C 83, at
80, 81, 82, 83-84, with Draft Constitutional Treaty, supra note 23, arts. 111-270, 111-271, III-
274, 111-275, 2004 O.J. C 310, at 118-19, 119-20, 121, 121-22.
75. An example of such a change included clarifying in TEU post-Lisbon Article 3
on the objectives of the EU, on the one hand, the objectives of the area of freedom,
security, and justice and, on the other hand, those of the internal market, with deletion
from these objectives of the words "where competition is free and undistorted," which had
caused emotion in the referendum debate in France. Compare TEU post-Lisbon, supra
note 38, art. 3(2-3), 2010 0.J. C 83, at 17, with Draft Constitutional Treaty, supra note
23, art. 1-3(2-3), 2004 O.J. C 310, at 11. This formula did not exist as such in the EC
Treaty; it was invented by the convention that had merged two existing formulas: "[A]
system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted," which had
been taken from Article 3(1)(g) of the EC Treaty and which listed the means to achieve
the objectives of the EC, and "an open market economy with free competition," which
had been taken from Articles 4, 98, and 105 of the EC Treaty and related to economic
and monetary union. A reference to the "protection of its citizens" was also added in
paragraph 5 (of Article 3 TFEU) on international relations. Compare TEU post-Lisbon,
supra note 38, art. 3(5), 2010 O.J. C 83, at 17, with Draft Constitutional Treaty, supra
note 23, art. 1-3(4), 2004 O.J. C 310, at 12.
76. In both cases, unanimity and ratification by Member States was provided for
while the Draft Constitutional Treaty provided for qualified majority and did not require
ratification by Member States. Compare TFEU, supra note 38, arts. 218(8), 262, 2010 0.J.
C 83, at 146, 162, with Draft Constitutional Treaty, supra note 23, arts. 111-325(8), 111-364,
2004 O.J. C 310, at 148, 159.
77. It was expressly specified in the legal bases in question that the measures the
EU can adopt on these matters are of a support character and do not allow
harmonization of national legislation. Compare TFEU, supra note 38, arts. 23, 168(5),
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passports and identity documents and on the freezing of assets in
the field of JHA were transferred to the title on the area of
freedom, security and justice.78
This period of extensive consultations helped the European
Council in June 2007 not only to prepare a report assessing "the
state of discussion with regard to the Constitutional Treaty and
[exploring] possible future developments,"7 9 as requested by the
European Council in June 2006, but also to present a very
detailed mandate for an IGC.
The draft IGC mandate will probably remain unique. It was
a kind of map, a game of orienteering inside the treaties. It
consisted of precise indications of where and how the
Constitutional Treaty's innovations (which were named
"innovations agreed in the 2004 IGC" in the mandate) should be
incorporated into the existing treaties. It also contained, mostly
in the form of articles or declarations already written, the forty
additions or modifications that had been agreed upon during the
extensive consultations. This somewhat revolutionary method was
made possible thanks to the drafting work that had already taken
place, i.e., the drafting of both a complete amending treaty and
the resulting consolidated versions of the treaties. One could
foresee in the mandate the future amending treaty and how the
future TEU and EC Treaty (TFEU) would look after
consolidation.
During the three days (and two nights) of the European
Council from June 21 to 23, the original draft mandate was
amended on several points. With respect to the nine areas listed
above, the following amendments were made80 :
189(2), 2010 0.J. C 83, at 58, 123, 132, with Draft Constitutional Treaty, supra note 23,
arts. 111-127, 111-254(2), 111-278(5), 2004 O.J. C 310, at 57, 112, 124.
78. Articles 75 and 77(3) of the TFEU were located in the title on the area of
freedom, security, and justice, thereby making them fall under the opt-out provided by
Protocols Nos. 21 and 22. Compare TFEU, supra note 38, arts. 75, 77(3), 2010 0.J. C 83,
at 75, 76, with Draft Constitutional Treaty, supra note 23, arts. 111-125, 111-160, 2004 O.J.
C 310, 56-57, 68.
79. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
80. See the IGC mandate that was agreed upon in the morning of June 23, 2007,
E.U. BULL., supra note 50. For a detailed overview of changes the mandate brought to
the innovations of the Constitutional Treaty, see PIRIS, THE TREATY OF LISBON, supra
note 6, at 33-40.
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1. Abolition of the Pillars: addition of two (repetitive)
declarations (Nos. 13 and 14) on the limits of CFSP and a
declaration (No. 24) stating that the grant of a single legal
personality to the Union did not change the allocation of
competences;8 2
2. Delimitation of Competences: addition of a reference to
national security as remaining within the sole responsibility of
Member States;83 an article on cooperation between Member
States in this area;84 three new protocols-on the exercise of
shared competence (No. 25)," on services of general interest
(No. 26)," and on the internal market and competition (No.
27) 87-and text concerning the repeal of EU legislative acts in
Declaration (No. 18) on the delimitation of competences;"8
3. Charter of Fundamental Rights: addition of a paragraph
on the interpretation of the Charter,89 a declaration (No. 1),"o
and a protocol (No. 30) on the application of the Charter to
Poland and the United Kingdom;9'
81. 2010 Consolidated TEU & TFEU, Declaration 13 Concerning the Common
Foreign and Security Policy, 2010 O.J. C 83/343, and Declaration 14 Concerning the
Common Foreign and Security Policy, id.
82. 2010 Consolidated TEU & TFEU, Declaration 24 Concerning the Legal
Personality of the European Union, 2010 O.J. C 83/346.
83. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 38, art. 4(2), 2010 O.J. C 83, at 18 ("In particular,
national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State.").
84. TFEU, supra note 38, art. 73, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 74.
85. 2010 Consolidated TEU & TFEU, Protocol (No. 25) on the Exercise of Shared
Competence, 2010 O.J. C 83/307.
86. 2010 Consolidated TEU & TFEU, Protocol (No. 26) on Services of General
Interest, 2010 O.J. C 83/308.
87. 2010 Consolidated TEU & TFEU, Protocol (No. 27) on the Internal Market
and Competition, 2010 O.J. C 83/309. This protocol was linked to the deletion of the
words "free and undistorted competition" in Article 3 of the TEU, a deletion which,
some feared, would make it more difficult to adopt legal acts in the field of mergers
since, under the EC Treaty, such acts had been adopted by using Article 308 (now
Article 352 TFEU) in association with the mention of a "system ensuring that
competition in the internal market is not distorted" in Article 33(1) (g) of the EC Treaty.
See Council Regulation 139/04/EC on the Control of Concentrations between
Undertakings, 2004 O.J. L 24/1.
88. 2010 Consolidated TEU & TFEU, Declaration 18 in Relation to the
Delimitation of Competences, 2010 O.J. C 83/344.
89. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 38, art. 6(1), 2010 O.J. C 83, at 19.
90. 2010 Consolidated TEU & TFEU, Declaration I Concerning the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2010 O.J. C 83/337.
91. 2010 Consolidated TEU & TFEU, Protocol (No. 30) on the Application of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland and to the United
Kingdom, 2010 O.J. C 83/313.
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4. Role of National Parliaments: addition of a strengthened
procedure by which national parliaments can seek to enforce the
principle of subsidiarity with regard to legislative acts adopted by
co-decision (the so-called "orange card")92 and a right of
objection by national parliaments on decisions to use the
passerelle in the area of family law;93
5. Enlargement: addition of a reference to the eligibility
criteria agreed upon by the European Council;9 4
6. Primacy of Union Law: addition of a reference to the
Court ofJustice's doctrine in a declaration (No. 17);95
7. Terminology: replacing the name "Union Minister for
Foreign Affairs" with "High Representative of the Union for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy";
8. Special Procedures: addition of a provision on facilitating
the use of enhanced cooperation through limiting the minimum
number of Member States required to launch such cooperation
to nine (instead of two-thirds)9 6 and extension of the scope of the
UK's opt-out protocol to also cover judicial cooperation in
criminal matters and police cooperation;97 and,
9. Clarification and Additions in Some Areas: addition of a
reference, in the statement of the Union's objectives, to the
economic and monetary union and the euro,98 and addition of a
92. 2010 Consolidated TEU & TFEU, Protocol (No. 2), supra note 47, art. 7(3),
2010 O.J. C 83/206, at 208.
93. TFEU, supra note 38, art. 81(3), 2010 O.J. C 83, at 79.
94. Compare TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 38, art. 49, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 43, with
Draft Constitutional Treaty, supra note 23, art. 1-58, 2004 O.J. C 310, at 38.
95. It was agreed to insert a legal opinion from the Legal Service of the Council.
This had never been done before. 2010 Consolidated TEU & TFEU, Declaration 17
Concerning Primacy, 2010 O.J. C 83/344; see also European Council, Opinion of the
Legal Service, 11197/07, JUR 260 (June 22, 2007).
96. See TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 38, art. 20(2), 2010 O.J. C 83, at 28.
97. See 2010 Consolidated TEU & TFEU, Protocol (No. 21) on the Position of the
United Kingdom and Ireland in Respect of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice,
2010 O.J. C 83/295. A cryptic sentence in the mandate left it to the IGC to consider the
issue of amendments made to existing measures and measures based on the Schengen
acquis. The resolution of this issue, under the expert leadership of Jean-Claude Piris,
occupied half of the time of the working group of legal experts of the IGC in September
2007.
98. Compare TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 38, art. 3(4), 2010 O.J. C 83, at 17, with
Draft Constitutional Treaty, supra note 23, art. 1-3, 2004 O.J. C 310, at 11-12.
THE STORY OF THE TREATY OF LISBON
reference to the fight against climate change in the article on the
environment 99 and to solidarity in the field of energy. 00
It was also agreed to postpone the entry into force of the
new double-majority system of Council voting to November 1,
2014, and allow a possibility, until March 31, 2017, for any
member of the Council to request the application of the old rule
of qualified-majority when a vote took place. 01
This negotiation was conducted masterfully by Chancellor
Merkel. At one point, after a meeting of high officials, many
thought all was lost because of a serious blockage by one
delegation. Some began to wander the corridors in a state of loss,
or "schadenfreuding" around, to the tune of "I told you so."
However, the atmosphere among the Heads of State or
Government, who were having a separate meeting under the
leadership of Chancellor Merkel, was calm, consistent, and
serious.
It is obvious that any renegotiation could only result, despite
the resistance of the eighteen Member States that had ratified
the Constitutional Treaty, in a retreat from or reframing of
certain advances of the Constitutional Treaty, which would not
necessarily correspond to what some proponents of the French
no vote, and of any (necessarily better) plan B, had in mind. But
when one decides to reshuffle the cards, one can never know in
advance what game will be on hand and how other players will
play.
In general, the European Council confirmed the approach
adopted during the preparatory work, namely that "the
constitutional concept ... is abandoned."10 2 The option chosen
in the end was that of a text that bore the least possible
99. Compare TFEU, supra note 38, art. 191(1), 2010 0.J. C 83, at 132, with Draft
Constitutional Treaty, supra note 23, art. 111-233(1), 2004 O.J. C 310, at 103.
100. Compare TFEU, supra note 38, arts. 122(1), 194(1), 2010 0.J. C 83, at 98, 134,
with Draft Constitutional Treaty, supra note 23, arts. 111-180(1), 111-256(1), 2004 O.J. C
310, at 77, 112.
101. See 2010 Consolidated TEU & TFEU, Protocol (No. 36) on Transitional
Provisions, art. 3(2), 2010 0.J. C 83/322, at 322. This was accompanied by an extension
of the so-called "loannina" mechanism, which had been approved under the
Constitutional Treaty. Compare Declaration 7 on Article 16(4) of the Treaty on European
Union and Article 238(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
2010 0.J. C 83, at 338, with Draft Constitutional Treaty, supra note 23, Declaration 7 on
Article 1-27, 2004 O.J. C 310, at 423.
102. E.U. BULL., supra note 50, at 16.
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resemblance to the Constitutional Treaty, while taking over most
of its substantial innovations. The institutional package had been
preserved.
In order to avoid letting things rest too long, the European
Council agreed to quickly convene an IGC, which was to be
immediately opened by the end of July and be completed by the
end of 2007, so that the treaty could be ratified before the
European elections of June 2009. The IGC was "to carry out its
work in accordance with the mandate." 03
The Council Legal Service prepared a draft treaty, the text
of which was already well advanced thanks to the earlier work,
and the draft was put on the table on July 23, the day of the
official launch of the IGC under the Portuguese presidency. The
main work of the IGC was carried out by a group of legal experts,
soon named the "Piris 11 Group" because it was chaired by Jean-
Claude Piris, as had been the group of legal experts of the IGC in
2004.104 This work was endorsed by the IGC at the level of
Foreign Ministers on October 5, and then transmitted to the
Heads of State or Government for their final meeting of October
18, 2007 in Lisbon. They agreed on some final amendments, 05
and the treaty was signed on December 17, 2007. Ratification
could now begin, the idea being that it would take place during
103. Id. at 9.
104. For a detailed overview of the work of this "Piris II" Group, and the
corrections it brought to the draft treaty, see PIRIS, THE TREATY OF LISBON, supra note 6,
at 40-44.
105. They reached an agreement on the future composition of the European
Parliament (on the basis of the suggestions made by the European Parliament),
deciding to increase the total membership to 751 instead of 750, see TEU post-Lisbon,
supra note 38, art. 14(2), O.J. C 83, at 22; 2010 Consolidated TEU & TFEU, Declaration
4 on the Composition of the European Parliament, 2010 O.J. C 83/337; Declaration 5
on the Political Agreement by the European Council Concerning the Draft Decision on
the Composition of the European Parliament, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 337; on a protocol
relating to the "loannina" Decision, see Protocol (No. 9) on the Decision of the Council
Relating to the Implementation of Article 16(4) of the Treaty on European Union and
Article 238(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union between 1
November 2014 and 31 March 2017 on the One Hand, and as from 1 April 2017 on the
Other, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 274; on the number of Advocates-General in the Court of
Justice of the European Union, see Declaration 38 on Article 252 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union Regarding the Number of Advocates-General in the
Court of Justice, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 350; and on the European Parliament's role in
appointing the High Representative, see Declaration 12 on Article 18 of the Treaty on
European Union, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 342. For a general discussion, see PIRIS, THE TREATY
OF LISBON, supra note 6 at 44-46.
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2008 in order to enable the treaty to enter into force on January
1, 2009.106 But the nerves would still be put to the test.
III. HISTORY PROLONGS THE STORY
Six months after the signing of the treaty, on June 12, 2008,
53% of the Irish people, in a referendum, said no to the Treaty of
Lisbon. A week later, the European Council, taking note of this
result, also noted "that the parliaments in 19 Member States have
ratified the Treaty and that the ratification process continues in
other countries." 07
In September, the subprime mortgage crisis erupted,
Lehman Brothers went bankrupt, and the financial system was on
the verge of apoplexy.
In December 2008, under the French presidency, the
European Council endorsed the components of a solution
(which would be formalized in June 2009) to enable Ireland to
hold a second referendum. This solution included a major stab
in the back to the institutional package that had been hitherto
untouchable. The European Council promised to abandon the
portion of the draft Lisbon Treaty that would have reduced
number of commissioners: " [T] he European Council agrees that
provided the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force, a decision will be
taken, in accordance with the necessary legal procedures, to the
effect that the Commission shall continue to include one
national of each Member State."10 8
106. This was the objective set out in the Treaty of Lisbon. Treaty of Lisbon, supra
note 48, art. 6(2), 2007 O.J. C 306, at 135 ("This Treaty shall enter into force on 1
January 2009, . .. or, failing that, on the first day of the month following the deposit of
the instrument of ratification by the last signatory State to take this step.").
107. Brussels European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, E.U. BULL., no. 6,
at 8 (2008).
108. Brussels European Council, Presidency Conclusions, E.U. BULL., no. 12, at 8
(2008). The other part was, thanks to the expert assistance of Jean-Claude Piris, a legal
guarantee given to Ireland that the Treaty of Lisbon did not change or affect some
sensitive areas for Ireland (taxation policy, family, social, and ethical issues, and defense
provisions with regard to Ireland's traditional policy of neutrality). See id. at 8-9. This
agreement was formalized in June 2009 in the form of a "Decision of the Heads of State
or Government," with the promise of turning it into a protocol "at the time of the
conclusion of the next accession Treaty," which meant a political link on the timing (to
be adopted at the same time as a separate act), but not that the protocol would be made
part of the accession treaty. Such a protocol could only be annexed to the treaties
through the ordinary revision procedure. See TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 38, art. 48(2)-
(5), 2010 0.J. C 83, at 42; Brussels European Council, Presidency Conclusions, E.U.
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Meanwhile, Ireland had been hit very hard by the financial
crisis, and the housing market had collapsed. The second
referendum was held on October 2, 2009, and 67% voted yes.
Ireland ratified the treaty on October 23, 2009.
But that would not be the end of the problems. Czech
President Vaklav Klaus decided not to sign the ratification of the
Treaty of Lisbon adopted in the spring of 2009 by the Czech
parliament, despite the fact that the Czech Constitutional Court
had held, on November 26, 2008, that the Charter of
Fundamental Rights and the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon
were consistent with the Czech Constitution.1 09 On September
29, 2009, three days before the second referendum in Ireland,
Mr. Klaus encouraged the filing of a further appeal to the Czech
Constitutional Court and demanded of the other EU Member
States that the Czech Republic also be covered by Protocol (No.
30) on the Application of the Charter to Poland and the United
Kingdom.
Cornered, the other Member States agreed in late October
to satisfy this request in the form of a promise similar to the one
made to Ireland, namely the adoption "at the time of the
conclusion of the next Accession Treaty" of a protocol amending
Protocol (No. 30) to add the Czech Republic.110 On November 3,
2009, the Czech Constitutional Court ruled that the additional
provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon that it had examined were
BULL., no. 6, at 8-9, 14-16 (2009). For a detailed overview, see PIRIS, THE TREATY OF
LISBON, supra note 6, at 51-60.
109. NAlez 10stavnfho soudu ze dne 26.11.2008 [Decision of the Constitutional
Court of Nov. 26, 2008], OS 19/08, available at http://www.concourt.cz/clanek/pl-19-08.
110. See Brussels European Council, Presidency Conclusions, October 2009 Annex
I to Doc. 15265/1/09, at 14, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms-
data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/110889.pdf. The process of ratification of the Treaty of
Lisbon was not easy in Germany and Poland either. In Germany, the Constitutional
Court had been requested to review the Treaty of Lisbon's compatibility with the
German Basic Law. In a strongly worded decision of June 30, 2009, the Constitutional
Court held the Treaty of Lisbon to be compatible with the German Basic Law, but
concluded that the German law should be changed to give more power to the German
parliament in some European procedures. The law was amended in September and the
ratification was deposited on September 25, 2009. In Poland, the Polish President Lech
Kaczyfiski had conditioned his signing of the ratification law (adopted by the Polish
Parliament in April 2008) to the ratification of the treaty by Ireland. He signed the law
on October 10, 2008 after the second referendum in Ireland, and the Polish ratification
was deposited on October 12, 2009. See generally PIRIS, THE TREATY OF LISBON, supra note
6, at 60-63.
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consistent with the Czech Constitution,'11 and on the same day,
Mr. Klaus agreed to sign the Czech ratification law of the Treaty
of Lisbon. This allowed the treaty to enter into force on
December 1, 2009.
EPILOGUE
Since then, the Treaty of Lisbon has commenced its life and
history continues to be made. The Heads of State or Government
chose and appointed the two personalities whom they wanted to
embody the two new functions created by the treaty: former
Prime Minister of Belgium Herman van Rompuy as the European
Council president, and former European Union Trade
Commissioner Catherine Ashton, from the United Kingdom, as
the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
The European diplomatic service was established by a sort of
merger-acquisition of relevant departments of the Council
Secretariat and the Commission, including the latter's network of
some 130 delegations to various countries and international
organizations.1 2 The European Parliament is now spreading the
wings of its new powers, though the trajectory is not always very
obvious. The European Council-to which, to their amazement
and disappointment, the Foreign Ministers are no longer
standing invitees, a fact that does not displease the Heads of State
or Government who can hold more frank discussions among
themselves-had to affront the storm of the sovereign debt crisis
in the euro area.
Like all its predecessors, the Treaty of Lisbon is commented
on, criticized, and even considered catastrophic; as in a poorly
organized banquet where the guests have waited too long for the
food, which arrived cold, and the party was a bit spoiled.
The fact is that some of the "internal flexibility" clauses,113
which the treaty contains in order to offset the introduction of a
more burdensome ordinary revision procedure (which requests
the automatic convening of a convention, unless the European
111. NAlez Ostavnfho soudu ze dne 03.11.2009 [Decision of the Constitutional
Court of Nov. 3, 2009], (S 29/09, available at http://www.concourt.cz/clanek/pl-29-09.
112. See Council Decision No. 2010/427/EU (European External Action Service),
2010 O.J. L 201/30.
113. See, e.g., PIRIs, THE TREATY OF LISBON, supra note 6, at 361-64 (listing
simplified revision procedures and passerelles).
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Parliament agrees not to do so), have been rendered much more
difficult to use," 4 and even, for some of them, are about to be
made meaningless because of the unilateral action of one
Member State.
This is particularly true with regard to the few so-called
passerelles provisions, which enable the European Council to
decide to shift the voting requirement of moste legal bases
(except for defense matters) in the treaty from unanimity to
qualified majority voting, without the need to amend the treaty
through the ordinary revision procedure and without the need
for national ratification. To use the general passerelle, the treaty
only provides for a procedure under which, in the absence of
objection by a national parliament within six months, the
European Council can adopt the decision to use the passerelle."5
Other specific passerelles may be used without any reference to
national parliaments.'16
However, the United Kingdom has introduced a bill whose
adoption would require the government to submit to a
referendum on not just any treaty amendment that would result
in transferring new competences or powers from the United
Kingdom to the Union, but almost all uses of a passerelle (whether
114. This is notably due to the German law adopted in September 2009 on the
occasion of the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, which provides in many cases, for the
use of the general passerelle, a national ratification procedure identical to that for an
amendment of the treaties. See PIRIS, THE TREATY OF LISBON, supra note 6, at 341-58.
115. See TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 38, art. 48(7), 2010 O.J. C 83, at 43
(conferring this power on the European Council, acting unanimously, after approval by
the European Parliament by a majority of its members). The instrument of the passerelle
is not new; it already existed in certain provisions of the EC Treaty. See EC Treaty, supra
note 40, art. 67(2), 2006 O.J. C 321, at 69 (passerelle in the field of immigration, asylum,
and judicial cooperation in civil matters); id. art. 137(2), at 108 (passerelle in the field of
social policy); id. art. 175(2)(c), at 125 (passerelle in the environmental field); see also
Council Decision No. 04/927/EC, 2004 O.J. L 396/45, which is an example of the use in
late 2004 of the passerelle in Article 67(2) of the EC Treaty. The novelty of the Treaty of
Lisbon is the insertion of a passerelle that can be used generally for all the legal bases of
the TFEU or for CFSP (except defense and the provisions listed in TFEU Article 353).
116. See TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 38, art. 31(3), (4), 2010 0.J. C 83, at 34
(passerellein the field of CFSP); see also TFEU, supra note 38, art. 153(2), 2010 O.J. C 83,
at 83 (passerelle in the field of social policy); id. art. 192(2), at 133 (passerelle in the field
of environment); id. art. 312(2), at 182 (passerelle in the field of the multiannual
financial framework); id. art. 333, at 191 (general passerelle within an enhanced
cooperation).
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general or specific) 117 The likely consequence of this law is that,
except in an area in which the United Kingdom does not
participate, either because of an opt-out or because there is an
established closer cooperation without the United Kingdom,
passerelles will in effect be made impossible to use.
Besides the EU bill in the United Kingdom, the extreme
difficulty of negotiating and ratifying the institutional package
that was wanted for fifteen years to help the Union face the
biggest enlargement in its history demonstrates that it has
become progressively impossible to change the treaties, except in
minor ways or in amendments unlikely to provoke a
referendum. 18 One has already observed this trend in the
decision to modify the TFEU to include a provision that will
concern only euro area Member States and does not increase the
competences conferred on the EU.119
117. See European Union Bill, 2010-11, H.C. Bill [106] (Gr. Brit.) (aiming to
strengthen the UK procedures for ratifying certain EU decisions and treaty changes).
The bill was presented to the UK parliament by the government on November 11, 2010.
118. Ratification by referendum has been used in Ireland and Denmark (where the
conditions provided by Article 20 of the Danish Constitution are met), and was
promised in the UK (EU draft bill) and Austria (statement by Chancellor Gusenbauer in
June 2008). Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon (at the time of writing,
June 2011), three minor amendments to the treaties have been decided. The first is to
help increase the number of members of the European Parliament until the end of the
present 2009-2014 parliamentary term. See Protocol Amending the Protocol (No. 36) on
Transitional Provisions Annexed to the Treaty on European Union, to the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union and to the Treaty Establishing the European
Atomic Energy Community, 2010 0.J. C 263/01 (this amending Protocol was adopted by
an IGC on June 23, 2010, without convening a convention; at the time of writing (June
2011), it had been ratified by twenty-one Member States). The second amendment
changes the status of the French island of Saint-Barth6lemy from that of outermost
region to that of overseas country or territory. See European Council Decision No.
2010/718/EU (Saint-Barthilemy), 2010 0.J. L 325/04/4 (based on the simplified revision
provided for in Article 355(6) of the TFEU). The third in the European Council
Decision which amended Article 136 TFEU. See infra note 119.
119. See European Council Decision No. 2011/199/EU, 2011 O.J. L 91/01. This
decision was adopted on March 25, 2011 and must be approved by Member States "in
accordance with their respective constitutional requirements." Id. It is based on the
simplified revision procedure provided for in TEU Article 48(6), which requires a
unanimous decision of the European Council, without the convening of a convention or
an IGC. The use of this procedure was possible because the Decision does not increase
the competences conferred on the Union. The Decision inserts into TEU Article 136 a
declaratory provision stating that Member States of the euro area may establish a stability
mechanism to preserve the stability of the euro area as a whole and that "the granting of
any required financial assistance under the mechanism will be made subject to strict
conditionality." Id.
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It is likely that in the future, those Member States who wish
to deepen their integration in a given area will have no choice
but to act either within the framework of enhanced
cooperation-in which the United Kingdom would not
participate if the participants want to be able to use the passerelle
within that area of enhanced cooperation-or through
intergovernmental cooperation or international agreements
outside the EU, but without the benefit of the tools available in
the Union's legal order (e.g., enforcement mechanisms, judicial
system). But that is another story.
